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A B S T R A C T   
Globally, effective emergency response to disease outbreaks is usually affected by weak coordination. However, 
coordination using an incident management system (IMS) in line with a One Health approach involving human, 
environment, and animal health with collaborations between government and non-governmental agencies result 
in improved response outcome for zoonotic diseases such as Lassa fever (LF). 
We provide an overview of the 2019 LF outbreak response in Nigeria using the IMS and One Health approach. 
The response was coordinated via ten Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) response pillars. Cardinal response 
activities included activation of EOC, development of an incident action plan, deployment of One Health rapid 
response teams to support affected states, mid-outbreak review and after-action review meetings. 
Between 1st January and 29th December 2019, of the 5057 people tested for LF, 833 were confirmed positive 
from 23 States, across 86 Local Government Areas. Of the 833 confirmed cases, 650 (78%) were from hotspot 
States of Edo (36%), Ondo (26%) and Ebonyi (16%). Those in the age-group 21–40 years (47%) were mostly 
affected, with a male to female ratio of 1:1. Twenty healthcare workers were affected. Two LF naïve states Kebbi 
and Zamfara, reported confirmed cases for the first time during this period. 
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The outbreak peaked earlier in the year compared to previous years, and the emergency phase of the outbreak 
was declared over by epidemiological week 17 based on low national threshold composite indicators over a 
period of six consecutive weeks. 
Multisectoral and multidisciplinary strategic One Health EOC coordination at all levels facilitated the swift 
containment of Nigeria’s large LF outbreak in 2019. It is therefore imperative to embrace One Health approach 
embedded within the EOC to holistically address the increasing LF incidence in Nigeria.   
1. Introduction 
Globally, effective emergency response to disease outbreak or events 
of public health importance is usually affected by weak multidiscipline 
and multi-sectoral coordination [1]. However, a well-coordinated inci-
dent management approach involving multiple stakeholders across 
human, environment and animal health sectors has been shown to yield 
better outbreak response outcomes particularly for zoonotic diseases 
[2]. The concept of One Health provides a platform for implementing 
joint response to infectious disease health threats such as Lassa fever 
(LF). The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines ‘One Health’ as an 
approach of designing and implementing programmes, policies, legis-
lation, and research in which multiple sectors communicate and 
collaborate to achieve better public health outcomes [3]. 
The 2017 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) core capacities in Nigeria demonstrated critical gaps 
including absence of a national strategy for proper coordination and 
institutionalisation of One Health in the country [4]. To address some of 
the gaps identified in the JEE, the 5-year One Health Strategic Plan 
(2019–2023) was developed and launched in 2019. Implementing this 
strategy in incident management of a priority infectious disease 
outbreak in the country could be an effective way of demonstrating the 
utility of the One Health approach in improving public health outcomes 
and health system resilience [5]. 
Since 2016, there has been an increase in the number of reported LF 
cases from West Africa, especially with the large 2018 outbreak in 
Nigeria. This increase has mainly been attributed to the complex inter-
play of increasing human–rodent interactions, improved case detection, 
heightened awareness, availability of diagnostics and therapeutics, 
improved disease surveillance systems, and changing demographics as 
opposed to the initial speculation of the emergence of a new Lassa virus 
(LASV) variant [6]. 
In recent years, the deviation from the usual dry seasonal to incessant 
all year transmission suggests a shift in the epidemiology of the disease, 
although high transmission still occurs in the dry season between 
December and March [7]. Factors such as seasonal changes, urbanisa-
tion, poor environmental sanitation, deforestation and voluntary or 
involuntary migration may have contributed to the sustained increase in 
LASV transmission and spill-over into human populations [8,9]. 
Given the role of the human, animal, and environmental interface in 
the increasing transmission of LF, the need for a multi-sectoral One 
Health approach for surveillance, early detection of spill over into 
human populations, and rapid public health emergency response during 
outbreaks cannot be overemphasised [9]. Hence, following the upsurge 
in LF cases in the first three weeks of January 2019, the Nigeria Centre 
for Disease Control (NCDC) on January 22, 2019 activated the LF One 
Health Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) to ensure a holistic response 
and early containment of the outbreak. This paper provides an overview 
of the 2019 LF outbreak response in Nigeria using the One Health 
approach Incident Management System (IMS). 
2. Epidemiological overview of the 2019 Lassa fever outbreak 
Between January 1 and December 29, 2019, a total of 5057 LF sus-
pected cases were reported from 36 states and the Federal Capital Ter-
ritory, of which 833 (16.6%) were laboratory confirmed cases, with 19 
probable cases [10]. Deaths among confirmed cases were 174, with a 
case fatality rate (CFR) of 21%. Twenty-three States recorded at least 
one confirmed case across 86 local government areas (LGAs) Fig. 1. LF 
naïve states such as Kebbi and Zamfara reported confirmed cases for the 
first time. 
Majority (78%) of the confirmed cases were reported from Edo 
(37%), Ondo (34%) and Ebonyi (7%), the three historical “hotspot” 
States characterised by high incidence and prevalence with sustained all 
year-round transmission Fig. 2. Those in the age-group 21–40 years 
(47%) were majorly affected with a male to female ratio of 1:1. Twenty 
(3%) of total confirmed cases occurred among health care workers 
(HCWs). A total of 9379 contacts were identified from 21 States, of 
which 144 (1.5%) became symptomatic and 68 (0.7%) tested positive 
[10]. 
3. Multi sectoral response using “One Health” EOC approach 
3.1. Coordination 
Following the rapid increase of LF cases reported in the first three 
weeks of 2019, a risk assessment was conducted and findings necessi-
tated activation of a level two LF national EOC on January 22, 2019. The 
International Health Regulation (IHR) Annex 2 decision instrument was 
used to assess the outbreak , outcome of the assessment led to immediate 
notification of World Health Organisation (WHO) i in accordance with 
article 6 of the IHR 2005. 
The national EOC coordinated the implementation of several key 
activities via the ten response pillars: coordination, surveillance, case 
management, infection prevention and control/safe burial, laboratory, 
risk communication, logistics, food safety, environmental sanitation 
plus vector control, and research (Fig. 2). Leveraging on strong multi-
sectoral and multipartner collaboration through a combination of 
technical and financial support, a One Health IMS coordinated response 
was mounted through the implementation of a transparent and 
accountable incident action plan (IAP). Resource mobilisation meetings 
were held with donors/partners to justify financial support for the 
outbreak response activities. 
Multi-sectoral One Health national rapid response teams (RRT) 
comprising of epidemiologists, clinicians, data analysts, veterinarians, 
environmental health officers, risk communication officers, surveillance 
officers, and laboratorians were deployed to the seven majorly affected 
states to provide onsite technical support while other affected states 
were supported remotely. WHO Global Outbreak Alert Response 
Network (GOARN) deployed an epidemiologist while UK-Public Health 
Rapid Support Team (PHRST) deployed two epidemiologists to support 
the response. 
State level One Health EOCs were activated with support from na-
tional RRT and partners for effective outbreak response coordination at 
the sub-national level. To ensure timely information sharing for action 
and effective monitoring of outbreak response, weekly teleconference 
meetings were held with the state EOCs and the treatment centres while 
weekly situation reports were developed and shared with stakeholders. 
A mid-outbreak review meeting was conducted by epidemiological 
week eight, four weeks post outbreak emergency declaration to review 
the outbreak response activities and improve the identified gaps. 
Following decline in cases, the emergency phase of the outbreak was 
declared over by epidemiological week 17 in accordance with the 
established low national threshold composite indicators [11]. 
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By epidemiological week 38, in line with the WHO IHR monitoring 
and evaluation framework, an outbreak after action review (AAR) 
meeting was convened with all key national and subnational stake-
holders to share experiences, identify best practices, gaps and lessons 
learnt to strengthen subsequent preparedness and response measures to 
LF outbreak in Nigeria (Fig. 3). 
3.2. Case management and psychosocial support 
Patients with suspected or confirmed LASV infections during out-
breaks were managed in dedicated LF isolation wards with facilities for 
enhanced supportive care including dialysis and respiratory support. 
This decreases case fatality rate and healthcare associated infection. 
[8,12]. The case management pillar coordinates the management of 
confirmed cases in the designated treatment/isolation centres across the 
country. Ten new treatment centres were identified, assessed, and 
designated as LF treatment centres in addition to the existing twelve 
treatment centres in-country to cater for the increasing incidence of LF. 
Capacity building and sensitisation of healthcare workers and profes-
sional bodies were conducted to heighten LFindex of suspicion. In-depth 
investigation of 20 healthcare worker infections as well as review of LF 
associated deaths was conducted. In addition, the team reviewed and 
disseminated the case management guidelines to healthcare workers. 
Surge staff - physicians, nurses, laboratorians, and hygienists were 
deployed to the overwhelmed treatment centres and corresponding 
laboratories to support limited human resource capacity. Out-of-pocket 
payment for LF treatment in most treatment centres could also have 
affected the health seeking behaviour leading to delayed presentation 
with attendant mortalities. 
Psychosocial support, a component of LF case management intended 
to provide holistic and improved quality of care for LF patients was 
introduced to help LF patients and their relatives overcome the fear and 
stigmatisation associated with the uncertainties of the disease [13]. 
3.3. Infection prevention and control/safe and dignified burial 
The Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) strategy allowed for 
outbreak response to be used for health systems strengthening. The 
response aimed at addressing issues related to increased index of sus-
picion, provision of IPC supplies and enforcement of the application of 
standard IPC precautions in all health facilities in the affected areas to 
minimize nosocomial infections. 
IPC assessments were carried out in identified treatment centres and 
the national Viral Haemorrhagic Fever IPC guideline was reviewed and 
disseminated to healthcare workers. In addition to promoting the need 
for improved personal hygiene and safe burial practices, the concept of 
“IPC ring strategy” was also introduced in the hotspot LGAs. The ring 
strategy involved sensitisation of HCWs to have a high index of suspicion 
and adhere strictly to IPC measures irrespective of provisional diagnosis 
at identified health facilities in high-risk areas where LF cases were most 
likely to present. A mapping of health facilities in the three hotspot LGAs 
in the six highest burden states was also conducted as well as an 
assessment of the IPC capacity in these health facilities. The assessments 
will inform future strengthening/establishment of IPC programmes in 
these health facilities. Furthermore, subnational safe/dignified burial 
teams were established and trained using the national safe burial pro-
tocol to prevent further transmission of the infection through unsafe 
burial rites. 
3.4. Surveillance 
Continuous monitoring of LF outbreak indicators enabled early 
detection and transition to an emergency mode. Alert and epidemic 
threshold (composite) indicators were set after thorough analysis of 
Fig. 1. Map Nigeria showing distribution of confirmed Lassa fever cases in Nigeria, 2019.  
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historical data and once threshold was exceeded, triggered the activa-
tion of the EOC [11]. 
The surveillance outbreak response management and analysis system 
(SORMAS) which is a real-time national data management system was 
utilised in fifteen states including the three hotspot states - Edo, Ondo 
and Ebonyi to improve incident case reporting and investigation on LF 
[14]. Standard operating procedures on contact tracing and active case 
search were developed and used to train state surveillance officers. 
Weekly analysis of data for situation reports were conducted and 
reviewed by the EOC to inform the response and deployment of RRTs. 
Intensified outbreak preparedness and response activities including 
enhanced surveillance were instituted across all states in the country, 
regardless of outbreak status to ensure all cases-at-risk, were rapidly 
detected, investigated, and reported. 
Cross border active case searching in neighbouring country of Benin 
republic was conducted at Baruten and Saki LGA in Kwara, and Oyo 
states respectively, following the report of possible exportation of cases 
to Benin Republic, however no cases were detected [15]. 
Event based surveillance (EBS) signals on LF transmission, preven-
tion and control as well as outbreak rumours were received from general 
public via phone calls, text messages, email and social media using 3 key 
receptors: Tatafo, the NCDC Connect Centre, and manual searches [16]. 
These alerts were escalated, investigated, and responded to via appro-
priate communication and notification channels. 
3.5. Laboratory 
The LF testing algorithm was standardised across the four LF testing 
laboratory network- Lagos university teaching hospital (LUTH), Irrua 
specialist teaching hospital (ISTH), Alex Ekwueme university teaching 
hospital (AEFUTHA) and National reference laboratory (NRL). A fifth LF 
testing laboratory in Nigeria was established in Ondo state through the 
support of Pan-African network for rapid, research, response and pre-
paredness for infectious disease epidemics (PANDORA) to improve the 
result turnaround time. A national sample transportation framework 
from all state capitals to the reference LF testing laboratories was 
established to improve the result turnaround time; however, this 
framework was not extended to sample transportation from the LGAs/ 
communities to the state capitals and this remains a great challenge. A 
total of 5057 samples were tested using real time polymerase chain re-
action test in the five laboratories on the LF Laboratory testing network. 
Chain of custody forms were developed and training on sample triple 
packaging conducted for state laboratory focal persons to improve 
sample integrity. Overall, turnaround time from sample collection to 
result dissemination improved from median of 72 h in 2018 to 48 h in 
2019. Genomic sequencing of positive LF samples was conducted during 
the outbreak to ascertain the predominant mode of transmission pattern 
which showed more of zoonotic spill-over and not of human-to-human 
transmission, contradicting the speculation of a possible new virus 
variant in circulation [17]. 
3.6. Risk Communication and social mobilisation 
Risk communication, community mobilisation, and advocacy are 
comprehensive behaviour change and awareness creation strategy to 
support the reduction of LF transmission. In collaboration with private, 
public and civil society organisation, intensive risk communication ac-
tivities were conducted via media appearances, press releases, advi-
sories, stakeholders’ advocacy to political, traditional and religious 
leaders. LF naïve states were prioritised with aggressive risk communi-
cation to improve the awareness. Sensitisation activities on LF trans-
mission, prevention and control practices, environmental sanitation and 
safe food processing methods were conducted via social and traditional 
media platforms. NCDC convened a multisectoral content development 
meeting to review the existing LF information, education and commu-
nication (IEC) materials to reflect One Health messaging. 
3.7. Logistics and supply chain management 
Logistics and supply chain management is a critical aspect of emer-
gency response. Response commodities such as medicines, personal 
protective equipment (PPE), guidelines, IEC materials and reagents were 
distributed across all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, treat-
ment centres and laboratories. Stockout of response materials such 
medicines and PPEs were averted through effective forecasting and 
prepositioning of response commodities as component of outbreak 
preparedness measure. State Logistic focal persons were identified and 
trained on inventory management to ensure sustainability of supply 
chain framework at subnational level. 
3.8. Research 
Research was introduced as a pillar to the existing EOC response 
pillars following the large LF outbreak in 2018. With the support of the 
WHO, the national LF research Plan was developed the same year, with 
the aim to identify, facilitate and support the conduct of research that 
would improve knowledge about LF and inform appropriate, evidence- 
based prevention, response, and control activities of the disease [18]. 
Fig. 2. 2019 National Lassa fever IMS structure.  
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An example would be a study conducted from the 2019 response on 
investigating the factors associated with delayed presentation to 
healthcare facilities of LF cases [19]. 
In January 2019, the NCDC convened the first Lassa Fever Interna-
tional Conference in Abuja, Nigeria, many questions were raised and the 
need to support further research on various aspects of LF was reiterated. 
In the same vein, the Nigeria Lassa Fever Research Consortium was in-
augurated, consisting of treatment centres, academia, supporting part-
ners and coordinated by the NCDC. 
3.9. Environmental sanitation, food safety and vector control - Integrated 
One Health approach 
Environmental Health and Animal health Interventions are pivotal 
for the prevention and control of zoonotic diseases. The exponential 
growth of human population, human encroachment on ecosystems, 
increased need for farming and exploration of wildlife sources of food, 
deforestation, and rapid urbanisation have increased the chances of 
human interaction with animals/wildlife and has resulted in a high risk 
of contracting zoonotic diseases [8]. 
Animal and environmental strategies for LF control include imple-
mentation of food safety and hygiene practices, environmental sanita-
tion, LF animal surveillance and vector control measures such as use of 
rodenticides with active local community sensitization and engagement 
by the LGA environmental health officers and veterinary officers [20]. 
Using an integrated One Health approach, the pillar supported by WHO, 
conducted rodent control and community environmental sanitation in 
high burden Esako-West, Esan-West, Owo and Ose LGAs in Edo and 
Ondo states, the two major LF hotspot states; collaboratively led by the 
IPC and risk communication pillars aimed at interrupting the disease 
transmission pathway. 
3.10. Military contribution to Lassa fever response 
Effective coordination of public health emergencies involves linking 
public health practice with security authorities such as the military [4] . 
The Nigeria ministry of defense (MoD) though not a pillar in the LF EOC 
work closely with the LF technical working group in the LF response. 
Following reports of LF cases from the barracks, the LF EOC collaborated 
with the MoD to strengthen LF surveillance and intensify risk commu-
nication within the barracks to ensure early detection, diagnosis, prompt 
case management and contact tracing. To scale up the existing treatment 
centres and strengthen surge capacity, the NCDC identified and jointly 
assessed one military medical facility in each of Nigeria’s six geopolitical 
zones for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment of LF cases. 
4. Discussion 
The One Health EOC response approach adopted in 2019 LF outbreak 
response leveraged on the lessons learnt from the large 2018 LF 
outbreak, led to significant improvement in the outbreak control evi-
denced by an early peak with a left-shift epidemic curve compared to 
previous years LF outbreaks. Furthermore, the One Health EOC provided 
opportunity to synergise the multisectoral response and coordinate 
collaborations from government and partners thus, the judicious utili-
zation of limited available resources during the outbreak [21]. 
To operationalise and institutionalise the One Health platform at the 
three tiers of government in zoonotic disease surveillance and outbreak 
response, the NCDC in collaboration with other ministries, departments, 
and agencies, developed a 5-year (2019–2023) strategic plan for One 
Health in Nigeria. This plan addresses the gaps identified in the Joint 
External Evaluation of the IHR core capacities. The plan reflects the 
shared commitment to enhance multi-sectoral collaborations in 
addressing human animal ecosystem public health challenges. If suc-
cessfully implemented, the plan will institutionalise the One Health 
approach, address zoonotic diseases, enhance food safety and security, 
improve livelihoods of many Nigerians, and keep Nigeria heathier and 
safer [4,5]. 
Disease surveillance, outbreak investigation and immediate response 
activities are primarily the responsibilities of state governments; 
nevertheless, funding gaps at subnational levels negatively impact the 
implementation of the incident action plans. Dedicating a substantial 
budget line for public health emergencies at both national and subna-
tional level is recommended to mitigate this challenge. The national 
level response was primarily funded by the Regional Disease Surveil-
lance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE) project through the World Bank. 
The use of this fund at the subnational level could significantly improve 
preparedness and response in the States. Private sector participation in 
health emergency funding as part of corporate social responsibility 
should also be explored through strong advocacy. 
The Nigeria Field Epidemiology Training Program (NFETP) is 
equally an important workforce development strategy that employs the 
One Health approach in training field epidemiologists. The programme 
is helping to advance the nation’s goal of having at least one field 
Fig. 3. Epidemic curve of 2019 Lassa fever outbreak in Nigeria with timeline of key response activities.  
C.D. Nwafor et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
One Health 13 (2021) 100346
6
epidemiologist to 200,000 population [22]. However, with the 
increasing need of a One Health RRT, the environment track should be 
incorporated in either the frontline or intermediate training pro-
grammes. Deployment of National RRT drawn from NCDC, inclusive of 
NFELTP residents/graduates, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (FMARD), Federal Ministry of Environment (FMoEnv) to 
the seven most affected states further reinforces the operationalisation 
of the One Health approach. 
The Northeast humanitarian crisis was thought to complicate the 
response as three north east states: Taraba, Adamawa and Bauchi re-
ported a significant proportion of confirmed cases by the epidemiolog-
ical week 7 of 2019. Special attention was therefore channelled to 
controlling the outbreak in the Northeast due to the prevailing hu-
manitarian crisis and deficient infection prevention and control [23]. 
Health workers are at risk of nosocomial LF infection with identified 
risks being the low index of suspicion among HCWs, inadequate IPC 
supplies and low adherence to the minimal standard IPC precautions 
[24]. The 2018 outbreak was heralded by cluster of cases among HCWs 
however, fewer HCWs were affected in the 2019 outbreak. 
Implementation of continuous rodent control measures, enforcement 
of environmental sanitation and food safety practices; institutionalisa-
tion of infection prevention and control governance at all levels, intro-
duction of free LF treatment and establishment of LF diagnostic 
laboratories in all geopolitical zones, establishment of EOC in all states 
in addition to timely release of adequate response funds, were critical 
recommendations from the AAR meeting to consolidate and institu-
tionalise effective One Health IMS for LF in Nigeria. 
5. Conclusion 
In response to the large Lassa fever 2019 outbreak in Nigeria, the 
multisectoral and multidisciplinary strategic One Health EOC coordi-
nation at national and subnational levels facilitated the swift contain-
ment of the outbreak. From our perspective, an integrated One Health 
coordination mechanism using the IMS is currently the best fit-for- 
purpose approach to holistically address the increasing LF incidence in 
Nigeria. 
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